Sellers diminishing benefit of sniping, increasing take?

[incredulous]

Anyone with a quick pointer before I start a search of literature on offsetting the value of sniping?

Sniping is about information withholding. Sellers could pay a premium or offer a discount to the successful buyer who first revealed her interest at some time earlier in the auction. By getting more sellers to reveal that they are in the auction, buyer may encourage all bidders to bid up their snipe price, and may come out ahead.

Example: For an item that is expected to close at $100, seller offers to the winning bidder a discount of $5 on the final price if the auction winner was also the higher bidder exactly five hours before the auction ends AND if that highest bid at that time is greater than $50. Another way to think of this is as a chained or linked auction, with the winner of the earlier auction earning the right to win the later auction at a discount from what she would otherwise have to pay, after the discount is received. Early winner still must bid high to win, while early losers will all have to bid $5.01 more than they would have to win the auction.

I've not thought this through, which is why I'd like to see references to an analytic literature on it. First, I'd like to find out what is wrong with this; then I'd like to learn what the considerations would be in optimization of the price adjustment for the seller.

[Note that if seller has agreed with buyer to discount shipping on multiple items, than some buyers --sometimes that means me -- can already afford to bid higher on items with a later close time from the same seller. I think that implies that when I am selling a base item and an accessory to that item, that the auction for the accessory should close later, unless I'm cheating ebay and packing profits into the shipping charges. In that case I don't want the buyer of the base item to drive the price of the accessory beyond its natural value including shipping

[Cupid]